In brief, then, Mathews's attack was so delivered that the weight of
thirteen of-the-line fell upon five Spanish of the same class, the
discomfiture of which, actually accomplished even under the misbehavior
of several British ships, separated the extreme rear, five other Spanish
vessels, from the rest of the allies. Whatever the personal merit or
lack of merit on the part of the commander-in-chief, such an
opportunity, pushed home by a "band of brothers," would at the least
have wiped out these rear ten ships of the allies; nor could the
remainder in the van have redeemed the situation. As for the method of
attack, it is worthy of note that, although adopted by Mathews
accidentally, it anticipated, not only the best general practice of a
later date, but specifically the purpose of Rodney in the action which
he himself considered the most meritorious of his whole career,--that of
April 17, 1780. The decisive signal given by him on that occasion, as
explained by himself, meant that each ship should steer, not for the
ship corresponding numerically to her in the enemy's order, but for the
one immediately opposite at the time the signal was made. This is what
Mathews and his seconds did, and others should have imitated. Singularly
enough, not only was the opportunity thus created lost, but there is no
trace of its existence, even, being appreciated in such wise as to
affect professional opinion. As far as Mathews himself was concerned,
the accounts show that his conduct, instead of indicating tactical
sagacity, was a mere counsel of desperation.

But after engaging he committed palpable and even discreditable
mistakes. Hauling to windward--away--when the _Marlborough_ forced him
ahead, abandoned that ship to overwhelming numbers, and countenanced the
irresolution of the _Dorsetshire_ and others. Continuing to stand north,
after wearing on the evening of the battle, was virtually a retreat,