unjustified by the conditions; and it would seem that the same false
step gravely imperilled the _Berwick_, Hawke holding on, most properly,
to the very last moment of safety, in order to get back his prize-crew.
Bringing-to on the night of the 23d was an error of the same character
as standing north during that of the 22d. It was the act of a doubtful,
irresolute man,--irresolute, not because a coward, but because wanting
in the self-confidence that springs from conscious professional
competency. In short, the commander-in-chief's unfitness was graphically
portrayed in the conversation with Cornwall from the quarter gallery of
the flag-ship. "If you approve and will go down with me, I will go
down." Like so many men, he needed a backer, to settle his doubts and to
stiffen his backbone. The instance is far from unique.

In the case of Byng, as of Mathews, we are not concerned with the
general considerations of the campaign to which the battle was
incidental. It is sufficient to note that in Minorca, then a British
possession, the French had landed an army of 15,000 men, with siege
artillery sufficient to reduce the principal port and fortress, Port
Mahon; upon which the whole island must fall. Their communications with
France depended upon the French fleet cruising in the neighborhood.
Serious injury inflicted upon it would therefore go far to relieve the
invested garrison.

[Illustration: Plan of Byng's Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756]

[Transcriber's Note: This illustration shows on a map the positions of
the fleets and their ships at various times in the action. Critical
positions on the map are marked with codes such as "B1" and "F2",
which will be referred to below in the text. This illustration is
available in the HTML version of the e-book.]