of the piece." The "Hun" is to Captain Wilson, as to the normal British
officer, just a "Boche" and no more; to the rank and file he was simply
"Jerry." If you want adjectives, you will have to look for them in _John
Bull_ or listen to speeches in the House of Commons.

For all who were in authority over him, whether Corps Commanders or
Divisional Generals, Brigadiers or temporary Commanding Officers,
Captain Wilson has a good word. A reader unfamiliar with soldiers'
psychology might deduce that all his superior officers had been
invariably models of judgment and efficiency. He would possibly be quite
wrong; but it is most fitting that this book should be framed on such
lines, for they are the lines which our soldiers have never failed to
accept. The rough is taken with the smooth. If ever there has been
incompetence men have simply blamed the system and cursed the War
Office. If they happened to have been five minutes in France they might
have philosophically added "c'est la guerre." The actual individual
responsible has not been worth worrying about. Thus even with regard to
this mere side issue, the author's story reflects a cardinal attribute
of the national character, and therefore in its essence conveys the
truth.

In my opinion, it is not, however, the whole truth. There is no reason
why England in her reconstruction should forget that want of sympathy
with the Territorials, which far too often marked men, to whose hands
their fortunes were from time to time entrusted. This vice should be
borne in mind not because the memory is bitter; but because by
remembrance we may make its repetition in later wars impossible.
Territorials ought never to be ousted from the command of their own
units, or to be excluded from staff appointments, merely because they
are not Regulars or because they fail to comply with needlessly drastic