popular discontent as an argument for severity; but that it is
unparliamentary and indecorous to urge that same danger as an
argument for conciliation? I, Sir, do entertain great
apprehension for the fate of my country. I do in my conscience
believe that, unless the plan proposed, or some similar plan, be
speedily adopted, great and terrible calamities will befall us.
Entertaining this opinion, I think myself bound to state it, not
as a threat, but as a reason. I support this bill because it
will improve our institutions; but I support it also because it
tends to preserve them. That we may exclude those whom it is
necessary to exclude, we must admit those whom it may be safe to
admit. At present we oppose the schemes of revolutionists with
only one half, with only one quarter of our proper force. We
say, and we say justly, that it is not by mere numbers, but by
property and intelligence, that the nation ought to be governed.
Yet, saying this, we exclude from all share in the government
great masses of property and intelligence, great numbers of those
who are most interested in preserving tranquillity, and who know
best how to preserve it. We do more. We drive over to the side
of revolution those whom we shut out from power. Is this a time
when the cause of law and order can spare one of its natural
allies?

My noble friend, the Paymaster of the Forces, happily described
the effect which some parts of our representative system would
produce on the mind of a foreigner, who had heard much of our
freedom and greatness. If, Sir, I wished to make such a
foreigner clearly understand what I consider as the great defects
of our system, I would conduct him through that immense city
which lies to the north of Great Russell Street and Oxford