making them. The other is, that no essential alterations are at all
wanting, and that neither now, nor at any time, is it prudent or
safe to be meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient
tried usages of our Constitution--that our representation is as
nearly perfect as the necessary imperfection of human affairs and of
human creatures will suffer it to be; and that it is a subject of
prudent and honest use and thankful enjoyment, and not of captious
criticism and rash experiment.

On the other side, there are two parties, who proceed on two
grounds--in my opinion, as they state them, utterly irreconcilable.
The one is juridical, the other political. The one is in the nature
of a claim of right, on the supposed rights of man as man; this
party desire the decision of a suit. The other ground, as far as I
can divine what it directly means, is, that the representation is
not so politically framed as to answer the theory of its
institution. As to the claim of right, the meanest petitioner, the
most gross and ignorant, is as good as the best; in some respects
his claim is more favourable on account of his ignorance; his
weakness, his poverty and distress only add to his titles; he sues
in forma pauperis: he ought to be a favourite of the Court. But
when the other ground is taken, when the question is political, when
a new Constitution is to be made on a sound theory of government,
then the presumptuous pride of didactic ignorance is to be excluded
from the council in this high and arduous matter, which often bids
defiance to the experience of the wisest. The first claims a
personal representation; the latter rejects it with scorn and
fervour. The language of the first party is plain and intelligible;
they who plead an absolute right, cannot be satisfied with anything
short of personal representation, because all natural rights must be