the rights of individuals: as by nature there is no such thing as
politic or corporate personality; all these ideas are mere fictions
of law, they are creatures of voluntary institution; men as men are
individuals, and nothing else. They, therefore, who reject the
principle of natural and personal representation, are essentially
and eternally at variance with those who claim it. As to the first
sort of reformers, it is ridiculous to talk to them of the British
Constitution upon any or all of its bases; for they lay it down,
that every man ought to govern himself, and that where he cannot go
himself he must send his representative; that all other government
is usurpation, and is so far from having a claim to our obedience,
that it is not only our right, but our duty, to resist it. Nine-
tenths of the reformers argue thus--that is, on the natural right.
It is impossible not to make some reflection on the nature of this
claim, or avoid a comparison between the extent of the principle and
the present object of the demand. If this claim be founded, it is
clear to what it goes. The House of Commons, in that light,
undoubtedly is no representative of the people as a collection of
individuals. Nobody pretends it, nobody can justify such an
assertion. When you come to examine into this claim of right,
founded on the right of self-government in each individual, you find
the thing demanded infinitely short of the principle of the demand.
What! one-third only of the legislature, of the government no share
at all? What sort of treaty of partition is this for those who have
no inherent right to the whole? Give them all they ask, and your
grant is still a cheat; for how comes only a third to be their
younger children's fortune in this settlement? How came they
neither to have the choice of kings, or lords, or judges, or
generals, or admirals, or bishops, or priests, or ministers, or
justices of peace? Why, what have you to answer in favour of the