The greatest part of these opinions, like current coin in its
circulation, we are obliged to take without weighing or examining; but by
this inevitable inattention, many adulterated pieces are received, which,
when we seriously estimate our wealth, we must throw away. So the
collector of popular opinions, when he embodies his knowledge, and forms
a system, must separate those which are true from those which are only
plausible. But it becomes more peculiarly a duty to the professors of
art not to let any opinions relating to that art pass unexamined. The
caution and circumspection required in such examination we shall
presently have an opportunity of explaining.

Genius and taste, in their common acceptation, appear to be very nearly
related; the difference lies only in this, that genius has superadded to
it a habit or power of execution. Or we may say, that taste, when this
power is added, changes its name, and is called genius. They both, in
the popular opinion, pretend to an entire exemption from the restraint of
rules. It is supposed that their powers are intuitive; that under the
name of genius great works are produced, and under the name of taste an
exact judgment is given, without our knowing why, and without being under
the least obligation to reason, precept, or experience.

One can scarce state these opinions without exposing their absurdity, yet
they are constantly in the mouths of men, and particularly of artists.
They who have thought seriously on this subject, do not carry the point
so far; yet I am persuaded, that even among those few who may be called
thinkers, the prevalent opinion gives less than it ought to the powers of
reason; and considers the principles of taste, which give all their
authority to the rules of art, as more fluctuating, and as having less
solid foundations than we shall find, upon examination, they really have.