ground of defence. The journals of the Lords show that the judges
were consulted. They answered, with one accord, that the articles
on which the earl was convicted amounted to high treason. This
judicial opinion, even if we suppose it to have been erroneous,
goes far to justify the Parliament. The judgment pronounced in
the Exchequer Chamber has always been urged by the apologists of
Charles in defence of his conduct respecting ship-money. Yet on
that occasion there was but a bare majority in favour of the
party at whose pleasure all the magistrates composing the
tribunal were removable. The decision in the case of Strafford
was unanimous; as far as we can judge, it was unbiassed; and,
though there may be room for hesitation, we think, on the whole,
that it was reasonable. "It may be remarked," says Mr. Hallam,
"that the fifteenth article of the impeachment, charging
Strafford with raising money by his own authority, and quartering
troops on the people of Ireland, in order to compel their
obedience to his unlawful requisitions, upon which, and upon one
other article, not upon the whole matter, the Peers voted him
guilty, does, at least, approach very nearly, if we may not say
more, to a substantive treason within the statute of Edward the
Third, as a levying of war against the King." This most sound and
just exposition has provoked a very ridiculous reply. "It should
seem to be an Irish construction this," says, an assailant of Mr.
Hallam, "which makes the raising money for the King's service,
with his knowledge, and by his approbation, to come under the
head of levying war on the King, and therefore to be high
treason." Now, people who undertake to write on points of
constitutional law should know, what every attorney's clerk and
every forward schoolboy on an upper form knows, that, by a
fundamental maxim of our polity, the King can do no wrong; that