every court is bound to suppose his conduct and his sentiments to
be, on every occasion, such as they ought to be; and that no
evidence can be received for the purpose of setting aside this
loyal and salutary presumption. The Lords therefore, were bound
to take it for granted that the King considered arms which were
unlawfully directed against his people as directed against his
own throne.

The remarks of Mr. Hallam on the bill of attainder, though, as
usual, weighty and acute, do not perfectly satisfy us. He defends
the principle, but objects to the severity of the punishment.
That, on great emergencies, the State may justifiably pass a
retrospective act against an offender, we have no doubt whatever.
We are acquainted with only one argument on the other side, which
has in it enough of reason to bear an answer. Warning, it is
said, is the end of punishment. But a punishment inflicted, not
by a general rule, but by an arbitrary discretion, cannot serve
the purpose of a warning. It is therefore useless; and useless
pain ought not to be inflicted. This sophism has found its way
into several books on penal legislation. It admits however of a
very simple refutation. In the first place, punishments ex post
facto are not altogether useless even as warnings. They are
warnings to a particular class which stand in great need of
warnings to favourites and ministers. They remind persons of this
description that there maybe a day of reckoning for those who
ruin and enslave their country in all forms of the law. But this
is not all. Warning is, in ordinary cases, the principal end of
punishment; but it is not the only end. To remove the offender,
to preserve society from those dangers which are to be
apprehended from his incorrigible depravity, is often one of the