between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other
hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity
obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are
naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that
either the one or the other should be present in the body,
inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or
black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of
many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one
quality or the other should be present in that of which they are
predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be
good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries
have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are
grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the
intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the
one nor the other.

Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow
and all the other colours that come between white and black; in
other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate,
but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in
the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor
unjust.

(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same
subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It
is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type
has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is
natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty
or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or
possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and