higher administrative preparation for the ironclad battle of the
following year.

It was the same in everything. The people had taken no interest
in the navy and Congress had faithfully represented them by
denying the service all chance of preparing for war till after
war had broken out. Then there was the usual hurry and horrible
waste. Fortunately for all concerned, Gideon Welles, after vainly
groping about the administrative maze for the first five months,
called Gustavus V. Fox to his assistance. Fox had been a naval
officer of exceptional promise, who had left the service to go
into business, who had a natural turn for administration, and who
now made an almost ideal Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He was,
indeed, far more than this; for, in most essentials, he acted
throughout the war as a regular Chief of Staff.

One of the greatest troubles was the glut of senior officers who
were too old and the alarming dearth of juniors fit for immediate
work afloat. It was only after the disaster at Bull Run that
Congress authorized the formation of a Promotion Board to see
what could be done to clear the active list and make it really a
list of officers fit for active service. Up to this time there
had been no system of retiring men for inefficiency or age. An
officer who did not retire of his own accord simply went on
rising automatically till he died. The president of this board
had himself turned sixty. But he was the thoroughly efficient
David Glasgow Farragut, a man who was to do greater things afloat
than even Fox could do ashore. How badly active officers were
wanted may be inferred from the fact that before the appointment
of Farragut's promotion board the total number of regular