officers remaining in the navy was only 1457. Intensive training
was tried at the Naval Academy. Yet 7500 volunteer officers had
to be used before the war was over. These came mostly from the
merchant service and were generally brave, capable, first-rate
men. But a nautical is not the same as a naval training; and the
dearth of good professional naval officers was felt to the end.
The number of enlisted seamen authorized by Congress rose from
7600 to 51,500. But the very greatest difficulty was found in
"keeping up to strength," even with the most lavish use of
bounties.

The number of vessels in the navy kept on growing all through. Of
course not nearly all of them were regular men-of-war or even
fighting craft "fit to go foreign." At the end of the first year
there were 264 in commission; at the end of the second, 427; at
the end of the third, 588; and at the end of the fourth, 671.

Bearing this in mind, and remembering the many other Northern
odds, one might easily imagine that the Southern armies fought
only with the courage of despair. Yet such was not the case. This
was no ordinary war, to be ended by a treaty in which compromise
would play its part. There could be only two alternatives: either
the South would win her independence or the North would have to
beat her into complete submission. Under the circumstances the
united South would win whenever the divided North thought that
complete subjugation would cost more than it was worth. The great
aim of the South was, therefore, not to conquer the North but
simply to sicken the North of trying to conquer her. "Let us
alone and we'll let you alone" was her insinuating argument; and
this, as she knew very well, was echoed by many people in the