been trying to make a question of veracity with me. I know the Judge is a
great man, while I am only a small man, but I feel that I have got him. I
demur to that plea. I waive all objections that it was not filed till
after default was taken, and demur to it upon the merits. What if Judge
Douglas never did talk with Chief Justice Taney and the President before
the Dred Scott decision was made, does it follow that he could not have
had as perfect an understanding without talking as with it? I am not
disposed to stand upon my legal advantage. I am disposed to take his
denial as being like an answer in chancery, that he neither had any
knowledge, information, or belief in the existence of such a conspiracy.
I am disposed to take his answer as being as broad as though he had put
it in these words. And now, I ask, even if he had done so, have not I a
right to prove it on him, and to offer the evidence of more than two
witnesses, by whom to prove it; and if the evidence proves the existence
of the conspiracy, does his broader answer denying all knowledge,
information, or belief, disturb the fact? It can only show that he was
used by conspirators, and was not a leader of them.

Now, in regard to his reminding me of the moral rule that persons
who tell what they do not know to be true falsify as much as
those who knowingly tell falsehoods. I remember the rule, and it
must be borne in mind that in what I have read to you, I do not
say that I know such a conspiracy to exist. To that I reply, I
believe it. If the Judge says that I do not believe it, then he
says what he does not know, and falls within his own rule, that
he who asserts a thing which he does not know to be true,
falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. I want
to call your attention to a little discussion on that branch of
the case, and the evidence which brought my mind to the
conclusion which I expressed as my belief. If, in arraying that