discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not wish to dwell
at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own opinion is,
that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico
and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not designed as
patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska Bill
did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious
distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that
the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between
the free and slave States. But there is still a difference, I think,
between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the
real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the
Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making
any difference between slavery and liberty; that he is in favor of
eradicating, of pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this
country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment
he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery.
Everything that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of
policy carefully excludes the thought that there is anything wrong in
slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to
exclude the thought that there is anything whatever wrong in slavery. If
you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed
sentences expressed by him,--as his declaration that he "don't care
whether slavery is voted up or down,"--you will see at once that this is
perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If you do
admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don't care
whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas declares that if
any community wants slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that
logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit