Lord George Germain, but he was himself without orders.
Afterwards the reason became known. Lord George Germain had
dictated the order to cooperate with Burgoyne, but had hurried
off to the country before it was ready for his signature and it
had been mislaid. Howe seemed free to make his own plans and he
longed to be master of the enemy's capital. In the end he
decided to take Philadelphia--a task easy enough, as the event
proved. At Howe's elbow was the traitorous American general,
Charles Lee, whom he had recently captured, and Lee, as we know,
told him that Maryland and Pennsylvania were at heart loyal to
the King and panting to be free from the tyranny of the
demagogue. Once firmly in the capital Howe believed that he would
have secure control of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. He
could achieve this and be back at New York in time to meet
Burgoyne, perhaps at Albany. Then he would hold the colony of New
York from Staten Island to the Canadian frontier. Howe found that
he could send ships up the Hudson, and the American army had to
stand on the banks almost helpless against the mobility of sea
power. Washington's left wing rested on the Hudson and he held
both banks but neither at Peekskill nor, as yet, farther up at
West Point, could his forts prevent the passage of ships. It was
a different matter for the British to advance on land. But the
ships went up and down in the spring of 1777. It would be easy
enough to help Burgoyne when the time should come.

It was summer before Howe was ready to move, and by that time he
had received instructions that his first aim must be to cooperate
with Burgoyne. First, however, he was resolved to have
Philadelphia. Washington watched Howe in perplexity. A great
fleet and a great army lay at New York. Why did they not move?