Washington knew perfectly well what he himself would have done in
Howe's place. He would have attacked rapidly in April the weak
American army and, after destroying or dispersing it, would have
turned to meet Burgoyne coming southward from Canada. Howe did
send a strong force into New Jersey. But he did not know how weak
Washington really was, for that master of craft in war
disseminated with great skill false information as to his own
supposed overwhelming strength. Howe had been bitten once by
advancing too far into New Jersey and was not going to take
risks. He tried to entice Washington from the hills to attack in
open country. He marched here and there in New Jersey and kept
Washington alarmed and exhausted by counter marches, and always
puzzled as to what the next move should be. Howe purposely let
one of his secret messengers be taken bearing a despatch saying
that the fleet was about to sail for Boston. All these things
took time and the summer was slipping away. In the end Washington
realized that Howe intended to make his move not by land but by
sea. Could it be possible that he was not going to make aid to
Burgoyne his chief purpose? Could it be that he would attack
Boston? Washington hoped so for he knew the reception certain at
Boston. Or was his goal Charleston? On the 23d of July, when the
summer was more than half gone, Washington began to see more
clearly. On that day Howe had embarked eighteen thousand men and
the fleet put to sea from Staten Island.

Howe was doing what able officers with him, such as Cornwallis,
Grey, and the German Knyphausen, appear to have been unanimous in
thinking he should not do. He was misled not only by the desire
to strike at the very center of the rebellion, but also by the
assurance of the traitorous Lee that to take Philadelphia would