Venezuela. The President stopped him with a question. No, said
the Ambassador, no word had come from Berlin. Then, Roosevelt
explained, it would not be necessary for him to wait the
remaining three days. Dewey would be instructed to sail a day
earlier than originally planned. He added that not a word of all
this had been put upon paper, and that if the German Emperor
would consent to arbitrate, the President would praise him
publicly for his broadmindedness. The Ambassador was still
convinced that no arbitration was conceivable.

But just twelve hours later he appeared at the White House, his
face wreathed in smiles. On behalf of his Imperial Master he had
the honor to request the President of the United States to act as
arbitrator between Germany and Venezuela. The orders to Dewey
were never sent, the President publicly congratulated the Kaiser
on his loyalty to the principle of arbitration, and, at
Roosevelt's suggestion, the case went to The Hague. Not an
intimation of the real occurrences came out till long after, not
a public word or act marred the perfect friendliness of the two
nations. The Monroe Doctrine was just as unequivocally invoked
and just as inflexibly upheld as it had been by Grover Cleveland
eight years before in another Venezuelan case. But the quiet
private warning had been substituted for the loud public threat.

The question of the admission of Japanese immigrants to the
United States and of their treatment had long disturbed American
international relations. It became acute in the latter part of
1906, when the city of San Francisco determined to exclude all
Japanese pupils from the public schools and to segregate them in
a school of their own. This action seemed to the Japanese a