led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible,
to do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason
they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they really
are: for men often approve of the action of others which they will
not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not. It cannot
possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or
conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent
person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the
fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given
no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the
circumstances of former friendship and obligation from the injured
person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two different
actions coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their
consequences to himself: to assert that any common man would be
affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he
would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove
them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.
There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in
mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to private
good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as
much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend
chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned merely as
another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some
degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of
course have some influence. The particular place assigned to it by
nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to
have, shall be hereafter considered.

From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and
private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the