of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to private good:
as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love:
neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or
others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the
individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be
instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so
to ourselves.

Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they
distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We
are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon
our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within
itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections as
respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several
actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one,
disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither
of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by
which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is
conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though
sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty
tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads
them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus
a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him
to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the
natural affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his
proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and
commendable so to do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much
more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and
difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from
that affection alone, if he thought it, and the cause of action it