resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of
these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the
occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence;
each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to
have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is
the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and
independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to
our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is
the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no
natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.

But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions
and principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well
as to do good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the
authors and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far
as they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by
asking, Has not man also dispositions and principles within which
lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the
many miseries else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are
instruments and authors of to themselves?

It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than
the other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind
have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as
well to the injury of others as in contradiction to known private
interest: but that as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so
neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards
another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is
plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no such thing as love of
injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager