desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a
very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain
by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their
end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will
consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found
nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles
and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-
love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right
behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only
secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to
avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater,
yet it is easy to see that the original tendency of shame is to
prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to
conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their being
done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first end.

If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great
measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-
creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without the
common natural affections to themselves. But the nature of man is
not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the
common world, in the bulk of mankind.

I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the
truth of this account of human nature, and make out the justness of
the foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears,
men in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their
nature which respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN
PRIVATE good and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which
respects SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good: that there are as few