HUMAN ACTIONS, some other behaviour of man to man? And could any
one be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence
or good-will was really the affection meant, but only by being made
to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to
which the appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled?
That what has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that
delight in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with
benevolence, only makes it more specious to call it ambition than
hunger, of the two: but in reality that passion does no more
account for the whole appearances of good-will than this appetite
does. Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that
good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and
rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? And can love of
power any way possibly come in to account for this desire or
delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's distinguishing
between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do
good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account
for the distinction and preference? For this principle can no
otherwise distinguish between objects than as it is a greater
instance and exertion of power to do good to one rather than to
another. Again, suppose good-will in the mind of man to be nothing
but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be
restrained by distant and accidental consideration; but these
restraints being removed, they would have a disposition to, and
delight in, mischief as an exercise and proof of power: and this
disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same principle
in the mind, as a disposition to and delight in charity. Thus
cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly the
same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to the
happiness, the other to the misery, of our fellow-creatures, is, it