seems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not the
least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of
capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and
will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally
stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly
discernible upon the mind of man.

If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing as
good-will in one man towards another (for the question is not
concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning
the affection itself), let it be observed that WHETHER MAN BE THUS,
OR OTHERWISE CONSTITUTED, WHAT IS THE INWARD FRAME IN THIS
PARTICULAR is a mere question of fact of natural history not
provable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and
determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history
are--by appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions
respectively, as the matter under consideration is cognisable by one
or the other: by arguing from acknowledged facts and actions for a
great number of actions in the same kind, in different
circumstances, and respecting different objects, will prove to a
certainty what principles they do not, and to the greatest
probability what principles they do, proceed from: and, lastly, by
the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of
benevolence amongst men may be as strongly and plainly proved in all
these ways, as it could possibly be proved, supposing there was this
affection in our nature. And should any one think fit to assert
that resentment in the mind of man was absolutely nothing but
reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what
is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways
than those in which it may be shown that there is such a thing in