without offending, the first thing to be observed is that people
should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most
have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour.

But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly
excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters
of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of
importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be
religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad,
but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as
great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad
men should be known, as that the characters of good men should.
People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an
ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service
towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even
concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This however
would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to.
First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that
men should have either good or ill characters which they do not
deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not
deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you
say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal
injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This therefore makes a
wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater
latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man
is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so
will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good
he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be
disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for
it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having