have from reflection upon our own. Now there is nothing strange or
unaccountable in our being thus carried out, and affected towards
the interests of others. For, if there be any appetite, or any
inward principle besides self-love; why may there not be an
affection to the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from that
affection's being gratified, and uneasiness from things going
contrary to it? {13}

Of these two, delight in the prosperity of others, and compassion
for their distresses, the last is felt much more generally than the
former. Though men do not universally rejoice with all whom they
see rejoice, yet, accidental obstacles removed, they naturally
compassionate all, in some degree, whom they see in distress; so far
as they have any real perception or sense of that distress:
insomuch that words expressing this latter, pity, compassion,
frequently occur: whereas we have scarce any single one by which
the former is distinctly expressed. Congratulation indeed answers
condolence: but both these words are intended to signify certain
forms of civility rather than any inward sensation or feeling. This
difference or inequality is so remarkable that we plainly consider
compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in
human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a
consequence of the general affection of love and good-will to them.
The reason and account of which matter is this: when a man has
obtained any particular advantage or felicity, his end is gained;
and he does not in that particular want the assistance of another:
there was therefore no need of a distinct affection towards that
felicity of another already obtained; neither would such affection
directly carry him on to do good to that person: whereas men in
distress want assistance; and compassion leads us directly to assist