them. The object of the former is the present felicity of another;
the object of the latter is the present misery of another. It is
easy to see that the latter wants a particular affection for its
relief, and that the former does not want one because it does not
want assistance. And upon supposition of a distinct affection in
both cases, the one must rest in the exercise of itself, having
nothing further to gain; the other does not rest in itself, but
carries us on to assist the distressed.

But, supposing these affections natural to the mind, particularly
the last; "Has not each man troubles enough of his own? must he
indulge an affection which appropriates to himself those of others?
which leads him to contract the least desirable of all friendships,
friendships with the unfortunate? Must we invert the known rule of
prudence, and choose to associate ourselves with the distressed? or,
allowing that we ought, so far as it is in our power to relieve
them, yet is it not better to do this from reason and duty? Does
not passion and affection of every kind perpetually mislead us?
Nay, is not passion and affection itself a weakness, and what a
perfect being must be entirely free from?" Perhaps so, but it is
mankind I am speaking of; imperfect creatures, and who naturally
and, from the condition we are placed in, necessarily depend upon
each other. With respect to such creatures, it would be found of as
bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections as to be
entirely governed by them. This would almost sink us to the
condition of brutes; and that would leave us without a sufficient
principle of action. Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is
not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as
man; but this reason joined with those affections which God has
impressed upon his heart, and when these are allowed scope to