of that divine Person, who was the example of all perfection in
human nature, as represented in the Gospels mourning, and even, in a
literal sense, weeping over the distresses of His creatures.

The observation already made, that, of the two affections mentioned
in the text, the latter exerts itself much more than the former;
that, from the original constitution of human nature, we much more
generally and sensibly compassionate the distressed than rejoice
within the prosperous, requires to be particularly considered. This
observation, therefore, with the reflections which arise out of it,
and which it leads our thoughts to, shall be the subject of another
discourse.

For the conclusion of this, let me just take notice of the danger of
over-great refinements; of going beside or beyond the plain,
obvious, first appearances of things, upon the subject of morals and
religion. The least observation will show how little the generality
of men are capable of speculations. Therefore morality and religion
must be somewhat plan and easy to be understood: it must appeal to
what we call plain common sense, as distinguished from superior
capacity and improvement; because it appeals to mankind. Persons of
superior capacity and improvement have often fallen into errors
which no one of mere common understanding could. Is it possible
that one of this latter character could even of himself have thought
that there was absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to
the good of others? suppose of parents to their children; or that
what he felt upon seeing a friend in distress was only fear for
himself; or, upon supposition of the affections of kindness and
compassion, that it was the business of wisdom and virtue to set him
about extirpating them as fast as he could? And yet each of these