convinced of his duty, when he owns and feels, and is actually under
the influence of the divine authority; whilst he is carrying on his
views to the grave, the end of all temporal greatness; under this
sense of things, with the better character and more desirable state
present--full before him--in his thoughts, in his wishes,
voluntarily to choose the worse--what fatality is here! Or how
otherwise can such a character be explained? And yet, strange as it
may appear, it is not altogether an uncommon one: nay, with some
small alterations, and put a little lower, it is applicable to a
very considerable part of the world. For if the reasonable choice
be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is
not this the same contradiction; that very inconsistency, which
appeared so unaccountable?

To give some little opening to such characters and behaviour, it is
to be observed in general that there is no account to be given in
the way of reason, of men's so strong attachments to the present
world: our hopes and fears and pursuits are in degrees beyond all
proportion to the known value of the things they respect. This may
be said without taking into consideration religion and a future
state; and when these are considered, the disproportion is
infinitely heightened. Now when men go against their reason, and
contradict a more important interest at a distance, for one nearer,
though of less consideration; if this be the whole of the case, all
that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind of brute force
within, prevails over the principle of rationality. However, if
this be with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of
things, then it is doing the utmost violence to themselves, acting
in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature. But if
there be any such thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon