that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify, an inclination
in a man's self. But the principle or inclination in one case is
self-love; in the other, hatred or love of another. There is then a
distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general
desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one
principle of action; and the particular affections towards
particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and
another principle of action. How much soever therefore is to be
allowed to self-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of
our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or
principles which come into it.

Further, private happiness or good is all which self-love can make
us desire, or be concerned about: in having this consists its
gratification: it is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own
interest, happiness, and private good: and in the proportion a man
hath this, he is interested, or a lover of himself. Let this be
kept in mind; because there is commonly, as I shall presently have
occasion to observe, another sense put upon these words. On the
other hand, particular affections tend towards particular external
things: these are their objects: having these is their end: in
this consists their gratification: no matter whether it be, or be
not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An action done from
the former of these principles is called an interested action. An
action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination of
passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the
particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds. Thus self-
love as one part of human nature, and the several particular
principles as the other part, are, themselves, their objects and
ends, stated and shown.