reflecting upon his own interest or happiness. The other, though
quite distinct from reason, are as much a part of human nature.

That all particular appetites and passions are towards EXTERNAL
THINGS THEMSELVES, distinct from the PLEASURE ARISING FROM THEM, is
manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were
it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the
passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more
than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if
there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than
another.

Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as
really our own affection as self-love; and the pleasure arising from
its gratification is as much my own pleasure as the pleasure self-
love would have from knowing I myself should be happy some time
hence would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular
affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its
gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such
particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way
of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from
self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be
resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the
language of mankind; or if it were, we should want words to express
the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from
cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an
action, suppose of revenge or of friendship, by which a man runs
upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest
the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want
different words to be distinguished by; all that they agree in is