exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others
into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or
changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in
an affection to ourselves. {25} This being the whole idea of self-
love, it can no otherwise exclude good-will or love of others, than
merely by not including it, no otherwise, than it excludes love of
arts or reputation, or of anything else. Neither on the other hand
does benevolence, any more than love of arts or of reputation
exclude self-love. Love of our neighbour, then, has just the same
respect to, is no more distant from, self-love, than hatred of our
neighbour, or than love or hatred of anything else. Thus the
principles, from which men rush upon certain ruin for the
destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a friend, have
the same respect to the private affection, and are equally
interested, or equally disinterested; and it is of no avail whether
they are said to be one or the other. Therefore to those who are
shocked to hear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed
that it is indeed absurd to speak thus of it; unless hatred, several
particular instances of vice, and all the common affections and
aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is
there any less inconsistence between the love of inanimate things,
or of creatures merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self-
love and the love of our neighbour? Is desire of and delight in the
happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love than desire
of and delight in the esteem of another? They are both equally
desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves; either both
or neither are so. The object of self-love is expressed in the term
self; and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of
the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the
objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else. Whatever