ridicule therefore the mention of a disinterested principle or
action may be supposed to lie open to, must, upon the matter being
thus stated, relate to ambition, and every appetite and particular
affection as much as to benevolence. And indeed all the ridicule,
and all the grave perplexity, of which this subject hath had its
full share, is merely from words. The most intelligible way of
speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions
done in consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the
same as to this question) are interested; that particular affections
towards external objects, and the actions done in consequence of
those affections are not so. But every one is at liberty to use
words as he pleases. All that is here insisted upon is that
ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions whatever,
and the actions they produce, are equally interested or
disinterested.

Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self-
love and benevolence; no greater competition between these than
between any other particular affections and self-love. This relates
to the affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any
peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which
these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition
between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any
other particular pursuits and that of private good.

There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such
peculiar contrariety, but only that the course of action which
benevolence leads to has a more direct tendency to promote the good
of others, than that course of action which love of reputation
suppose, or any other particular affection leads to. But that any