had wished to postpone annexation until the assent of the people
of that province could be obtained. But he believed that all the
territory necessary for the geographical completeness of the
United States had not yet been brought under the flag. He had
just obtained Florida from Spain and a claim westward to the
Pacific north of the forty-second parallel, but he considered the
Southwest--Texas, New Mexico, and California--a natural field of
expansion. These areas, then almost barren of white settlers, he
expected time to bring into the United States, and he also
expected that the people of Cuba would ultimately rejoice to
become incorporated in the Union. He wished natural forces to
work out their own results, without let or hindrance.

Not only was Adams opposed to Canning's proposed self-denying
ordinance, but he was equally averse to becoming a partner with
England. Such cooperation might well prove in time to be an
"entangling alliance," involving the United States in problems of
no immediate concern to its people and certainly in a partnership
in which the other member would be dominant. If Canning saw
liberal England as a perpetual minority in absolutist Europe,
Adams saw republican America as a perpetual inferior to
monarchical England. Although England, with Canada, the West
Indies, and her commerce, was a great American power, Adams
believed that the United States, the oldest independent nation in
America, with a government which gave the model to the rest,
could not admit her to joint, leadership, for her power was in,
not of, America, and her government was monarchical. Already
Adams had won a strategic advantage over Canning, for in the
previous year, 1822, the United States had recognized the new
South American republics.