Great as were the dangers involved in cooperation with England,
however, they seemed to many persons of little moment compared
with the menace of absolutist armies and navies in the New World
or of, perhaps, a French Cuba and a Russian Mexico. The only
effective obstacle to such foreign intervention was the British
Navy. Both President Monroe and Thomas Jefferson, who in his
retirement was still consulted on all matters of high moment,
therefore favored the acceptance of Canning's proposal as a means
of detaching England from the rest of Europe. Adams argued,
however, that England was already detached; that, for England's
purposes, the British Navy would still stand between Europe and
America, whatever the attitude of the United States; that
compromise or concession was unnecessary; and that the country
could as safely take its stand toward the whole outside world as
toward continental Europe alone. To reject the offer of a country
whose assistance was absolutely necessary to the safety of the
United States, and to declare the American case against her as
well as against the more menacing forces whose attack she alone
could prevent, required a nerve and poise which could come only
from ignorant foolhardiness or from absolute knowledge of the
facts. The self-assurance of Adams was well founded, and no
general on the field of battle ever exhibited higher courage.

Adams won over the Cabinet, and the President decided to
incorporate in his annual message to Congress a declaration
setting forth the attitude of the United States toward all the
world, and in particular denying the right of any European power,
England included, to intervene in American affairs. In making
such a statement, however, it was necessary to offer compensation