stood on fairly even terms with that of Spain. Captain, later
Admiral, Mahan, considered that the loss of the Maine shifted a
slight paper advantage from the United States to Spain. In
personnel, however, the American Navy soon proved its
overwhelming superiority, which was due not solely to innate
ability but also to sound professional training.

The Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, had a thorough
appreciation of values. Although Congress had not provided for a
general staff, he himself appointed a Naval War Board, which
served many of the same purposes. Upon this Board he appointed
Rear Admiral Sicard, who but for ill health would have commanded
the main fleet; Captain A. S. Crowninshield; and, most important,
Captain A. T. Mahan, whose equal as master of the theory and
history of naval warfare no navy of the world could show. The
spirit of the fighting force was speedily exhibited by such
exploits as that of Lieutenant Victor Blue in boldly plunging
into the Cuban wilderness to obtain information regarding the
position of Admiral Cervera's fleet, though in this dangerous
sort of work the individual palm must be given to Lieutenant A.
S. Rowan of the army, whose energy and initiative in overcoming
obstacles are immortalized in Elbert Hubbard's "Message to
Garcia," the best American parable of efficient service since the
days of Franklin.

Efficient, however, as was the navy, it was far from being a
complete fighting force. Its fighting vessels were totally
unsupplied with that cloud of servers--colliers, mother ships,
hospital ships, and scouts--which we now know must accompany a
fleet. The merchant marine, then at almost its lowest point, was