not in a position entirely to fill the need. The United States
had no extensive store of munitions. Over all operations there
hung a cloud of uncertainty. Except for the short campaign of the
Chino-Japanese War of 1894, modern implements of sea war remained
untested. Scientific experiment, valuable and necessary as it
was, did not carry absolute conviction regarding efficient
service. Would the weapons of offense or defense prove most
effective? Accidents on shipboard and even the total destruction
of vessels had been common to all navies during times of peace.
That the Maine had not been a victim of the failure of her own
mechanism was not then certain. Such misgivings were in the minds
of many officers. Indeed, a report of the total disappearance of
two battling fleets would not have found the watchful naval
experts of the world absolutely incredulous. So much the higher,
therefore, was the heroism of those who led straight to battle
that complex and as yet unproved product of the brain--the modern
warship.

While negotiations with Spain were in their last stages, at the
orders of Secretary Long a swift vessel left San Francisco for
Honolulu. There its precious cargo was transferred to the warship
Baltimore, which then made hurriedly for Hongkong. It contained
the ammunition which was absolutely necessary if Commodore George
Dewey, in command of the Asiatic squadron, was to play a part in
the war. The position of his squadron, even after it received its
ammunition, was indeed singular. After the war began, it was
unable to obtain coal or other supplies from any neutral port and
at the same time it was equally unable to remain in any such port
without being interned for the duration of the war. There
remained but one course of action. It must not be forgotten that