inclinations, and hence it comes about that though people have listened
together to the same case being tried, they often form different
opinions about it, and sometimes, though arriving at the same
conclusion, they have been influenced by very different motives.
Moreover, each one has a bias in favour of his own interpretation, and
thus, when a second party enunciates an opinion which he himself has
arrived at, he takes it for gospel and holds to it firmly.
Consequently, a pleader should give each member of the jury something
that he may get hold of and recognise as his own opinion.

Regulus once said to me when we were in Court together: "You think you
ought to follow up every single point in the case: I lose no time in
getting a view of my opponent's throat, and consider only the easiest
way of cutting it." (I must admit that he does cut it when he gets hold
of it, but often in trying to get a hold he makes a mistake.) Here was
my answer to him: "Yes, but sometimes what you think is the throat is
only the knee, or the shin bone or the ankle. As for myself, I may not
be quick at getting a clear view of my enemy's throat, but I keep
feeling for a grip and try him at every point. In short, as the Greeks
say, 'I leave no stone unturned.'" I am like a husbandman, I look
carefully after not only my vineyards but my orchards, not only my
orchards but my meadows, while in the meadows I set seed for barley,
beans, and other vegetables, as well as for spelt and the best white
wheat. So when I plead in the Courts I scatter my arguments like seeds
with a lavish hand, and reap the crop that they produce. For the minds
of judges are as obscure, as little to be relied upon, and as deceptive
as the dispositions of storms and soils.

Nor do I forget that in his eulogy of that consummate orator, Pericles,
the comedy-writer Eupolis used the following language:--"But besides his