had been occasioned by a violent storm. A courier appeared on the right
bank of the river. He reached the island. Bonaparte read in the
despatches of the Directory that the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse and
the Rhine were in motion; that they were preparing to cross the Rhine,
and had commenced hostilities on the very day of the signing of the
preliminaries. This information arrived seven days after the Directory
had written that "he must not reckon on the co-operation of the armies of
Germany." It is impossible to describe the General's vexation on reading
these despatches. He had signed the preliminaries only because the
Government had represented the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine as
impracticable at that moment, and shortly afterwards he was informed that
the co-operation was about to take place! The agitation of his mind was
so great that he for a moment conceived the idea of crossing to the left
bank of the Tagliamento, and breaking off the negotiations under some
pretext or other. He persisted for some time in this resolution, which,
however, Berthier and some other generals successfully opposed. He
exclaimed, "What a difference would there have been in the preliminaries,
if, indeed, there had been any!"

His chagrin, I might almost say his despair, increased when, some days
after his entry into the Venetian States, he received a letter from
Moreau, dated the 23d of April, in which that general informed him that,
having passed the Rhine on the 20th with brilliant success, and taken
four thousand prisoners, it would not be long before he joined him.
Who, in fact, can say what would have happened but for the vacillating
and distrustful policy of the Directory, which always encouraged low
intrigues, and participated in the jealousy excited by the renown of the
young conqueror? Because the Directory dreaded his ambition they
sacrificed the glory of our arms and the honour of the nation; for it
cannot be doubted that, had the passage of the Rhine, so urgently