demanded by Bonaparte, taken place some days sooner, he would have been
able, without incurring any risk, to dictate imperiously the conditions
of peace on the spot; or, if Austria were obstinate, to have gone on to
Vienna and signed it there. Still occupied with this idea, he wrote to
the Directory on the 8th of May: "Since I have received intelligence of
the passage of the Rhine by Hoche and Moreau, I much regret that it did
not take place fifteen days sooner; or, at least, that Moreau did not say
that he was in a situation to effect it." (He had been informed to the
contrary.) What, after this, becomes of the unjust reproach against
Bonaparte of having, through jealousy of Moreau, deprived France of the
advantages which a prolonged campaign would have procured her? Bonaparte
was too devoted to the glory of France to sacrifice it to jealousy of the
glory of any individual.

In traversing the Venetian States to return to Milan, he often spoke to
me of Venice. He always assured me that he was originally entirely
unconnected with the insurrections which had agitated that country; that
common sense would show, as his project was to advance into the basin of
the Danube, he had no interest in having his rear disturbed by revolts,
and his communications interrupted or cut off: "Such an idea," said he,
"would be absurd, and could never enter into the mind of a man to whom
even his enemies cannot deny a certain degree of tact." He acknowledged
that he was not vexed that matters had turned out as they had done,
because he had already taken advantage of these circumstances in the
preliminaries and hoped to profit still more from them in the definitive
peace. "When I arrive at Milan," said he, "I will occupy myself with
Venice." It is therefore quite evident to me that in reality the
General-in-Chief had nothing to do with the Venetian insurrections; that
subsequently he was not displeased with them; and that, later still, he
derived great advantage from them.