had acquired by an interval of peace. Besides, by the mere fact of the
conclusion of the treaty England proved to all Europe that the
restoration of the Bourbons was merely a pretext, and she defaced that
page of her history which might have shown that she was actuated by
nobler and more generous sentiments than mere hatred of France. It is
very certain that the condescension of England in treating with the First
Consul had the effect of rallying round him a great many partisans of the
Bourbons, whose hopes entirely depended on the continuance of war between
Great Britain and France. This opened the eyes of the greater number,
namely, those who could not see below the surface, and were not
previously aware that the demonstrations of friendship so liberally made
to the Bourbons by the European Cabinets, and especially by England, were
merely false pretences, assumed for the purpose of disguising, beneath
the semblance of honourable motives, their wish to injure France, and to
oppose her rapidly increasing power.

When the misunderstanding took place, France and England might have
mutually reproached each other, but justice was apparently on the side of
France. It was evident that England, by refusing to evacuate Malta, was
guilty of a palpable infraction of the treaty of Amiens, while England
could only institute against France what in the French law language is
called a suit or process of tendency. But it must be confessed that this
tendency on the part of France to augment her territory was very evident,
for the Consular decrees made conquests more promptly than the sword.
The union of Piedmont with France had changed the state of Europe. This
union, it is true, was effected previously to the treaty of Amiens; but
it was not so with the states of Parma and Piacenza, Bonaparte having by
his sole authority constituted himself the heir of the Grand Duke,
recently deceased. It may therefore be easily imagined how great was
England's uneasiness at the internal prosperity of France and the