that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon
Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal
powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and to
territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the
report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of
arguments.

After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I
returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France.
I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him
that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting the
war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the Kingdom
of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since he had
Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as several of
his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no secret of
this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the north of
Germany.

But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting. Napoleon's intentions
I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than
positive.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw, assured, as there
seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom
free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were
pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for
it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon,
in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer
was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be
blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just