guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon
therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or
resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish
provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would
be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her
into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian
provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should
Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions
did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of
success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the
Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation
occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was
successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia,
with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three at
once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his
victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of
neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only that
he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over all
obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising those
dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on the banks of
the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of Sulkowski.

Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities.
Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there never
was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many
circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same
thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of
the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which
accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible
persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed