the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in
the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as it were
unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible
demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was ambition.
He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its
power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet Caesar's
Commentaries, which were his favourite study, ought to have shown him
that Caesar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another illusion by
which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and perhaps past
experience rendered it very excusable, was the belief that the Emperor
Alexander would propose peace when he saw him at the head of his army on
the Russian territory. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte at Moscow can
indeed be accounted for in no other way than by supposing that he
expected the Russian Cabinet would change its opinion and consent to
treat for peace. However, whatever might have been the reason, after his
long and useless stay in Moscow Napoleon left that city with the design
of taking up his winter quarters in Poland; but Fate now frowned upon
Napoleon, and in that dreadful retreat the elements seemed leagued with
the Russians to destroy the most formidable army ever commanded by one
chief. To find a catastrophe in history comparable to that of the
Beresina we must go back to the destruction of the legions of Varus.

Notwithstanding the general dismay which prevailed in Paris that capital
continued tranquil, when by a singular chance, on the very day on which
Napoleon evacuated the burning city of Moscow, Mallet attempted his
extraordinary enterprise. This General, who had always professed
Republican principles, and was a man of bold decided character, after
having been imprisoned for some time, obtained the permission of
Government to live in Paris in a hospital house situated near the
Barriere de Trove. Of Mallet's, conspiracy it is not necessary to say