considerable loss. It was nearly mid-day before a passage through
Charleroi was secured by the French army, and General Zieten continued
his retreat upon Fleurus, where he took up his position for the night.
Upon Zieten's abandoning, in the course of his retreat, the chaussee
which leads to Brussels through Quatre Bras, Marshal Ney, who had only
just been put in command on the left of the French army, was ordered to
advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the
Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops under the command of
Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained
his position. "Notwithstanding all the exertions of the French at a
moment when time was of such importance, they had only been able to
advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen
hours of daylight."

It was the intention of Napoleon during his operations on this day to
effect a separation between the English and Prussian armies, in which he
had nearly succeeded. Napoleon's plan for this purpose, and the
execution of it by his army, were alike admirable, but it is hardly
probable that the Allied generals were taken by surprise, as it was the
only likely course which Napoleon could have taken. His line of
operation was on the direct road to Brussels, and there were no fortified
works to impede his progress, while from the nature of the country his
numerous and excellent cavalry could be employed with great effect.

In the French accounts Marshal Ney was much blamed for not occupying
Quatre Bras with the whole of his force on the evening of the 16th. "Ney
might probably have driven back the Nassau troops at Quatre Bras, and
occupied that important position, but hearing a heavy cannonade on his
right flank, where General Zieten had taken up his position, he thought
it necessary to halt and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus.