He was severely censured by Napoleon for not having literally followed
his orders and pushed on to Quatre Bras." This accusation forms a
curious contrast with that made against Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon threw
the blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he strictly fulfilled his
orders, by pressing the Prussians at Wavre, unheeding the cannonade on
his left, which might have led him to conjecture that the more important
contest between the Emperor and Wellington was at that moment raging.

It was at six o'clock in the evening of the 16th that the Drake of
Wellington received the first information of the advance of the French
army; but it was not, however, until ten o'clock that positive news
reached him that the French army had moved upon the line of the Sambre.
This information induced him to push forward reinforcements on Quatre
Bras, at which place he himself arrived at an early hour on the 16th, and
immediately proceeded to Bry, to devise measures with Marshal Blucher in
order to combine their efforts. From the movement of considerable masses
of the French in front of the Prussians it was evident that their first
grand attack would be directed against them. That this was Napoleon's
object on the 16th maybe seen by his orders to Ney and Grouchy to turn
the right of the Prussians, and drive the British from their position at
Quatre Bras, and then to march down the chaussee upon Bry in order
effectually to separate the two armies. Ney was accordingly detached for
this purpose with 43,000 men. In the event of the success of Marshal Ney
he would have been enabled to detach a portion of his forces for the
purpose of making a flank attack upon the Prussians in the rear of St.
Amend, whilst Napoleon in person was directing his main efforts against
that village the strongest in the Prussian position. Ney's reserve was
at Frasnes, disposable either for the purpose of supporting the attack on
Quatre Bras or that at St. Amand; and in case of Ney's complete success
to turn the Prussian right flank by marching on Bry.