which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,
or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
that it involves neither existence nor duration ; consequently,
it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must
be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things, but also of their essence.
Proof.-If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
essence of things ; and therefore the essence of things can (by
Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is
absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
Q.E.D.
Note.-This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
existence-in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This
will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
Corollary.-Individual things are nothing but modifications of
the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears
from Prop. xv. and Def. v.