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Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza
page 30 of 298 (10%)
PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God ; and that
which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
act.
Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
obvious) ; therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
xxv. and xvi.) ; this is our first point. Our second point is
plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not
been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
absurd.

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is
finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in
its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
infinity.
Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
Coroll.).
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