Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza
page 30 of 298 (10%)
page 30 of 298 (10%)
![]() | ![]() |
|
PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God ; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act. Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious) ; therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.) ; this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd. PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned. Proof.-This proposition is evident from the third axiom. PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity. Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.). |
|