they will be heard ere long in the madness of mobs, and the
conflicts of armed men.

I observe it is now universally the fashion to speak of the first
personage in the state as the great obstacle to the measure. In the
first place, I am not bound to believe such rumours because I hear
them; and in the next place, I object to such language, as
unconstitutional. Whoever retains his situation in the ministry
while the incapacities of the Catholics remain, is the advocate for
those incapacities; and to him, and to him only, am I to look for
responsibility. But waive this question of the Catholics, and put a
general case: --How is a minister of this country to act when the
conscientious scruples of his Sovereign prevent the execution of a
measure deemed by him absolutely necessary to the safety of the
country? His conduct is quite clear--he should resign. But what is
his successor to do?--Resign. But is the King to be left without
ministers, and is he in this manner to be compelled to act against
his own conscience? Before I answer this, pray tell me in my turn
what better defence is there against the machinations of a wicked,
or the errors of a weak Monarch, than the impossibility of finding a
minister who will lend himself to vice and folly? Every English
Monarch, in such a predicament, would sacrifice his opinions and
views to such a clear expression of the public will; and it is one
method in which the Constitution aims at bringing about such a
sacrifice. You may say, if you please, the ruler of a state is
forced to give up his object when the natural love of place and
power will tempt no one to assist him in its attainment; this may be
force; but it is force without injury, and therefore without blame.
I am not to be beat out of these obvious reasonings, and ancient
constitutional provisions, by the term conscience. There is no