regard to one whose station, joined to virtue, renders him really
useful to society, then to one, who exerts the social virtues
only in good intentions and benevolent affections. Separating the
character from the furtone, by an easy and necessary effort of
thought, we pronounce these persons alike, and give them the
appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail our sentiment.

Why is this peach-tree said to be better than that other; but
because it produces more or better fruit? And would not the same
praise be given it, though snails or vermin had destroyed the
peaches, before they came to full maturity? In morals too, is not
THE TREE KNOWN BY THE FRUIT? And cannot we easily distinguish
between nature and accident, in the one case as well as in the
other?]



The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social
intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to
these general preferences and distinctions, without which our
conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered
intelligible to each other. Every man's interest is peculiar to
himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it,
cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General
language, therefore, being formed for general use, must be
moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets
of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from
the general interests of the community. And if these sentiments,
in most men, be not so strong as those, which have a reference to
private good; yet still they must make some distinction, even in