persons the most depraved and selfish; and must attach the notion
of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary.
Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for
ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter
than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very
reason it is necessary for us, in our calm judgements and
discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these
differences, and render our sentiments more public and social.
Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this
particular, we every day meet with persons who are in a situation
different from us, and who could never converse with us were we
to remain constantly in that position and point of view, which is
peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore,
in society and conversation, makes us form some general
unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of
characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part
entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love
and hatred by the universal abstract differences of vice and
virtue, without regard to self, or the persons with whom we are
more intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a
considerable influence, and being sufficient, at least for
discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on
the theatre, and in the schools.

[Footnote: It is wisely ordained by nature, that private
connexions should commonly prevail over univeral views and
considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be
dissopated and lost, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a
small benefit done to ourselves, or our near friends, excites
more lively sentiments of love and approbation than a great